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| Topic: | Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:How are mental operations observed? |
| Posted by: | joe becker |
| Date/Time: | 2010/9/19 23:36:16 |
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Loathe as I am to reject any idea that I have got something right, I must decline Michael's compliment.?I am not able to reconcile various statements of Michael in his last email with what I intended to be saying in mine.?It seems to me that Michael and I do not yet have a common language that can let us clarify where we agree and where we don't. For example, Michael writes,?"At the sensory or motor stage 1, the participant has to have perception."? For me perception includes the kind of experience that Michael says we cannot assess.?That's what I tried to express by putting SEE in capitals.? As I understand Michael, he does not include such experience in what he calls perception --I say that because he inserts perception into the causal links proposed by his approach, and I think he would not do this unless he considered perception assessable.?(That's part of my way of understanding the kind of perspective I think Michael adopts).? For me, each of the terms" perceiving", "seeing", "hearing" etc. indicates a kind of way the organism experiences; for me, these terms indicate phenomenological events.?For me, robots do not perceive, see, hear, etc.although they may process signals from the environment marvelously well, and behave accordingly (e.g., move around things rather than bump into them).? Michael, if you want to reserve these terms for the way you use them--i.e., as not necessarily involving experience-- then let me know what terms you would like me to use for my view.?Then I may be able to articulate better where I think your response misses the kinds of thing I want to say, and then we may be better able to locate our agreements and disagreements. |