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| Topic: | Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:Re:How are mental operations observed? |
| Posted by: | Michael Lamport Commons |
| Date/Time: | 2010/9/19 23:35:33 |
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Boy, do you have it right.?At the sensory or motor stage 1, the participant has to have perception.?But it is not coordinated flexibly with action as is the case at stage 2, circular-sensory motor?For example, to respondent condition, the environment stimulus that is going to come to elicit the conditioned response, has to be detectable.?But these stimuli are different ed not by concepts.?But the perceptual difference between a cross and circle is enough.?Ralph Miller should be able to let us know.? There is no way to assess what the pigeon experiences.?But we do know what they can do.?Likewise, most single celled animals can detect stimuli, have tropisms and reflexes but do not choose among stimuli such as a cross and circle.?To some people, making a choice is phenomenological.?But is it necessary to know even if it would be nice to know? But then other questions become relevant-- such as does the consciousness that arises influence behavior or it is epiphenomenal.?From my theory, it is necessary and not epiphenomenal for operant condition to work.?I think we have lots of evolutionary and physiological evidence that that is what is happening.?But my theory is controversial with the more Skinnerian Quantitative of Analysis of Behavior people. For operant conditioning to work, emotions have to be elicited by the unconditioned operant reinforcer SR+(UCS).?Otherwise salience would not be conditioned to the stimulus that elicits the "operant" response.?As Peter Killeen has pointed out the operant reinforcer SR+(UCS) is also paired with the environmental stimuli giving rise to incentives. |