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"What the Model of Hierarchical Complexity proposed is that the structure that Inhelder posited was in the mind, was really in the structure of the tasks." Suppose 1. that it is correct that MHC analyzes tasks of different domains and allots each task a number that represents its "absolute" level of complexity--by "absolute" I mean here that the value for the task's complexity is determined independently of?domain or content differences, so that tasks can be compared across these; 2. that empirically we find that, controlling for various external/other factors that affect performance, people are consistent across domains in the maximum complexity level at which they succeed. 3. suppose that it was agreed that the external/other factors should be controlled for?(I put this in because it is possible to argue, for example, that controlling for understanding of necessity, or removing tasks in which that understanding is relevant, seriously misses the point). Then this would be strong evidence for stages.? But it would require explanation in terms of something internal to the person. As I see it Michael C prefers to use information processing variables, such as working memory capacity, and ideas about how these vary with age and time spent coping with the environment, rather than distinctions between types of mental structures and ideas about how later mental structures emerge.?His view is that the ideas about different types of mental structures, and how later ones emerge, should be fated to Occam's razor (hence his reference to the ether, and life force.). Presumably, Michael C's perspective also includes explanations of the ways in which the consistency assumed in (2) above is broken--for example, in Chi's work on domain specific expertise. However, it seems to me that, the use of working memory to explain such findings as (2) above, as also for the expert-novice work, probably requires such concepts as chunking (referenced in one of?Michael C's recent emails).?That is, it requires getting into issues of mental organization.?The question then is what is to be said about such organizations.?How are they to be described??Is association taken from the behaviorist tradition adequate??If not, what concepts are needed??How do these compare/contrast with those used by Piaget and Inhelder to distinguish between pre-operational, formal operational and concrete operational organization, such as level of reversibility.? My first suggestion:?When one looks in detail at some of the work purporting to show that changes in knowledge organizations do not require Piagetian-like distinctions, one finds that the analyses simply have not been taken far enough to see the similarity--see?Becker, J. (2000). Distinguishing necessary and contingent knowledge. In M. Laupa, (Ed.),?Rights and wrongs: How children and young adults evaluate the world. New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development, 89, 63-76. My second suggestion:? What is missing from MHC is precisely subjective experience.?I claim that that there are qualitative shifts in what people subjectively experience, both in regard to sensory experience and in regard to conceptual experience such as feelings of logical necessity.?I predict that the idea of mental organizations/structures will be crucial in making progress on consciousness.?I have taken a stab in that direction in??Becker, J. (2008) Conceptualizing mind and consciousness: Using constructivist ideas to transcend the physical bind. Human Development, 51, 165-189. and in?Becker, J. (2004). Reconsidering the role of overcoming perturbations in cognitive development: Constructivism and consciousness. Human Development, 47, 77-93.