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A: In Piaget’s unit of analysis at issue was: what kind of reasoning is on display in this person? B: Quite different is a unit of analysis such as: what kind of reasoner is this student? What’s the difference? At issue in A?was that person’s notion of truth, i.e. how truth was interpreted, consciously or otherwise, for an epistemological analysis,. At issue in B was/is whether this or that inference has been?made correctly or incorrectly - irrespective of that reasoner’s interpretation of truth. To make a correct deduction is not thereby to understand its truth, still less its logical truth - this difference is substantive and fundamental too. Does this matter? - Yes, for anyone committed to a developmental epistemology as an alternative contrary to realism or conventionalim (nominalism) about truth, reason, reality and similarly fundamental notions. - Yes, for anyone concerned with the interpretation of "Piaget’s theory? - No for most research on ‘formal reasoning?which deals with B but not A (dual process theories, etc), or with neither A not B (heuristics etc) The latter is fair enough, provided premature conclusions are not drawn about what is covered by the former duality. A rationale for this distinction is in my 2009 paper; there is a lot more in preparation. Smith, L. (2009). Piaget's developmental epistemology. In U. Müller, J. Carpendale, & L. Smith (eds.). Cambridge companion to Piaget. [pp. 64-93]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.