An integrated conception of critical thinking is developed in the light of some of the better known theories in the field: some philosophers argue that critical thinking is constituted by particular skills; others that it is most importantly a critical attitude or disposition; and others that it is constituted by substantial knowledge.  Integrated critical thinking, I argue, is constituted
 by the skills of critical reasoning;
 by particular dispositions,
 in the sense of a critical attitude and the commitment to give expression to this attitude, and
 in the sense of a foundational moral orientation; and
 by substantial knowledge of particular content, both
 of concepts in critical thinking, and
 of a particular discipline. 
I defend the position that each of these attributes is a necessary condition for critical thinking, but none on its own is a sufficient condition.

My intention here is to defend an integrated conception of critical thinking that addresses the apparent inadequacies of some of the better known positions in the field.  To this end, different philosophers who have developed theories of critical thinking are considered.  Some argue that critical thinking is constituted by particular skills, such as the ability to assess reasons properly, or to weigh relevant evidence, or to identify fallacious arguments.  Others argue that it is most importantly a critical attitude or disposition, such as the tendency to ask probing questions, or a critical orientation, or some such attribute intrinsic to character.  Or, if critical thinking is constituted by dispositional knowledge, some suggest that this would be in the sense of a moral foundation or set of values that motivates critical thinking.  Still other philosophers argue that it is constituted by substantial knowledge of particular content.  Some mean by this knowledge about concepts in critical thinking such as premises, assumptions, or valid arguments.  And others mean deep and wide knowledge of a particular discipline and its epistemological structure, so that one is a critical thinker only within that discipline in which you’re well versed.

Five of the most important philosophers of education who defend one or another of these positions, and whom I will consider briefly here, are Robert Ennis, Richard Paul, John McPeck, Harvey Siegel, and Jane Roland Martin. As we shall see, Ennis defends a conception of critical thinking based primarily in particular skills; Paul also emphasizes the skills associated with critical thinking.  McPeck argues that critical thinking is specific to a particular discipline, and that it depends on a thorough knowledge and understanding of the content and epistemology of the discipline.  Siegel, for whom critical thinking means to be “appropriately moved by reasons”, defends both a “reason assessment component” in the skills domain, and a “critical attitude component” in the dispositional domain.  Martin, who emphasizes the dispositions associated with critical thinking, suggests that it is motivated by and founded in moral foundations and particular values.

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